Admins configure one mail server; each staff member gets their own mailbox
login. Read, reply and compose against real IMAP/SMTP.
IMAP and SMTP are raw TCP, so none of this can run in a browser — every
operation is a TanStack Start server function. mail.functions.ts ships to
the client bundle, so imapflow/nodemailer/mailparser and the crypto
helpers are imported inside handlers, never at the top level. Verified
that Nitro inlines all three into .output/server/_libs, since the Docker
runner stage copies only .output and has no node_modules.
Note this ties the app to the Node deployment: the default local build
targets Cloudflare Workers, which cannot open IMAP sockets.
Credential handling, since a mailbox password grants full read and send
access to someone's mail:
- user_mailboxes has RLS enabled, no policies, and SELECT revoked from
anon and authenticated. Verified: teacher and admin both see zero rows
and no ciphertext; only service_role can read it. The revoke is belt and
braces — Supabase's default privileges had granted SELECT, leaving the
table one stray policy away from leaking.
- Passwords are sealed with AES-256-GCM using MAIL_CRED_KEY from
.env.secret, so a database dump alone opens nothing. GCM also makes
tampering fail the auth tag instead of decrypting to garbage.
- Provisioning verifies credentials against the live IMAP server before
storing them, so typos surface at setup rather than as a broken inbox.
Message bodies render as plain text; sender HTML is never injected, which
would execute sender-controlled markup and leak read receipts via
tracking pixels.
Mailboxes are limited to admins and teachers. Students are excluded
deliberately — external mail for minors carries archiving, monitoring and
consent obligations that should be chosen, not inherited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a per-student daily rate (students.daily_tuition_cents) and a trigger
that writes a tuition charge when a student is marked present or late.
Idempotency is the crux. The attendance UI upserts on (student_id, date)
and teachers toggle a status freely — present, absent, present again. A
naive "insert a charge on attendance" trigger bills the family once per
click. So each auto-charge is bound to the attendance row that caused it
via ledger_entries.attendance_id (UNIQUE), which turns the write into an
upsert, lets a change back to absent delete the charge, and cascades the
charge away if the attendance record is deleted.
Manual entries keep attendance_id NULL — Postgres allows unlimited NULLs
in a unique index — so hand-entered charges are untouched and the UI can
tell auto from manual.
A NULL rate (the default) means never auto-charge, so nothing begins
billing until a rate is deliberately set on a student. Existing
attendance is not backfilled: retroactively generating charges against
families' balances should be an explicit decision, not a side effect of
deploying a migration.
The trigger is SECURITY DEFINER because the writer is a teacher marking
attendance while ledger_entries is admin-write under RLS; teachers gain
no general ledger access, only this fixed attendance-derived write.
Verified against the live schema across all eight paths: charge on
present, reversal on absent, no duplicate on re-mark, late billable,
excused free, no rate means no charge, rate change on re-save, and
cascade on attendance delete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plans, accommodations, related services, annual goals with progress
monitoring, meetings/team, and signed documents — plus a compliance
list and dashboard alerts for annual-review and triennial re-evaluation
dates (overdue in red, due-within-30-days in amber).
Access is tiered because special-education records are need-to-know
under FERPA:
FULL admin, the plan's case manager, the student's parents
IMPL the above, plus any teacher of the student — accommodations
and services only, never eligibility or meeting notes
RLS is row-level and every app role is the same Postgres role
(`authenticated`), so column grants cannot separate the tiers. The
split is therefore physical: confidential fields live in plan_details,
plan_goals, plan_meetings and plan_documents rather than as columns on
student_plans.
The UI asks the database which tier applies via the same predicates the
policies use (can_view_plan_full / can_edit_plan) instead of re-deriving
the rules client-side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- intake_tokens table (server-only via service role)
- Server functions: createIntakeToken (admin), getIntakeToken (public validate),
submitIntake (public write + mark used, 14-day one-time tokens)
- Public /intake/$token full intake form (no login) with valid/used/expired states
- Student profile (admin): generate link, copy, and email-to-parent (mailto)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Parents and teachers are now view-only on student data (profile, guardians,
pickups, curriculum logins). Writes restricted to admins in RLS and the UI;
read access unchanged. Portal logins for parents/students are view-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
admin
